THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT AS A CHALLENGE TO

THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT AS A CHALLENGE TO AMERICAHOW DOES THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT STACK UP AGAINST OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN ASIA SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II? JUDGED PURELY AS A SUMMIT, PYONGYANG WOULD SEEM TO BEAR COMPARISON WITH PRESIDENT NIXON'S BREAKTHROUGH BEIJING MEETING WITH MAO ZEDONG IN 1972. JUDGED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY, IN TERMS OF THE NEW CHALLENGES THAT IT HAS PRODUCED FOR THE UNITED STATES, PYONGYANG HAS SIMILARITIES TO THE FRENCH DEFEAT AT DIEN BIEN PHU IN 1954.

HOW CAN ANYONE DRAW A PARALLEL BETWEEN A CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEAT SUFFERED BY FRANCE IN THE JUNGLES OF VIETNAM FORTY-SIX YEARS AGO, AND A SIGNAL DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS SCORED BY PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG IN PYONGYANG LAST JUNE? THE POINT IS THAT BOTH EVENTS MARKED THE OPENING OF NEW ERAS IN THEIR REGIONS. THE RELEVANT QUESTION IS WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WILL DO BETTER IN DEALING WITH THE CHANGED SITUATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA THAT THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT IS PRODUCING, THAN IT DID IN REACTING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE WAKE OF FRANCE'S DEFEAT AND WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM.

AMERICA'S TRAGIC INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM HAS BEEN REANALYZED IN DEPTH THIS YEAR, THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR IGNOMINIOUS EVACUATION FROM SAIGON. WE UNSUCCESSFULLY FOUGHT A WAR IN VIETNAM BECAUSE IN THE DECADE BETWEEN FRANCE'S DEFEAT AT DIEN BIEN PHU AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE FIRST AMERICAN COMBAT TROOPS NEAR DANANG, WE HAD CHOSEN TO DEAL WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE STARK AND RIGID TERMS OF THE COLD WAR, RATHER THAN SEEKING TO UNDERSTAND THE REGION IN ITS MORE SUBTLE POST-COLONIAL TERMS. OUR KOREAN WAR EXPERIENCE HAD FORMED A PRISM THROUGH WHICH WE VIEWED UNFOLDING EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. WE SAW CHINA AS THE THREAT TO SOUTH VIETNAM, WHEN IN FACT IT WAS THE IMPLACABLE NATIONALISTIC DESIRE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO REUNIFY THEIR COUNTRY THAT WAS OUR REAL OPPONENT.

THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT IS A SUCCESS, NOT A FAILURE, BUT IT IS STARTING A PARADIGM SHIFT IN NORTHEAST ASIA. SEOUL'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVISM AND ITS NEW DIALOGUE WITH PYONGYANG WILL BECOME MORE AND MORE CENTRAL IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THE REGION. THESE NEW FACTORS WILL GRADUALLY CHANGE THE WAY AMERICANS ARE VIEWED BY THE COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA. THIS SHIFT WILL ALSO REQUIRE US TO RE-EXAMINE OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION, AND HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THEM. THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK FOR AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE. INITIAL PUBLIC KOREAN REACTIONS TO THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT HAVE IN SOME CASES INCLUDED SOME NEGATIVISM REGARDING A CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THEIR COUNTRY, AND ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE ONCE AGAIN ERUPTED. THE INITIAL AMERICAN REACTION TO THE SUMMIT HAS BEEN SEEN BY SOME KOREANS AS BEING TOO NEGATIVE AND SKEPTICAL. THIS INDICATES TO THEM THAT OUR MAIN CONCERN ABOUT THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT IS THAT IT MAY WEAKEN THE RATIONALE FOR A CONTINUING MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

IN OKINAWA AS WELL, WHERE MOST OF THE US TROOPS IN JAPAN ARE STATIONED, THE LARGEST ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN YEARS HAVE TAKEN PLACE, WITH OKINAWANS CALLING FOR A REDUCED US PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND. THIS PROBLEM IS A LONG-STANDING ONE THAT PRE-DATES THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT BY MANY YEARS, AND OKINAWAN AGITATION FOR A PARTIAL US PULLOUT IS CERTAIN TO BE STIMULATED BY PARALLEL PRESSURES THAT DEVELOP IN KOREA.

CHINA, STILL LOCKED INTO STEREOTYPED, HARD-LINE PATTERNS OF THOUGHT, IS DELIGHTED BY THESE TRENDS. BEIJING DEFINES THE AMERICAN DESIRE TO STAY ENGAGED IN NORTHEAST ASIA AS "HEGEMONIC," AND CAN BE COUNTED UPON TO TRY TO LIMIT OUR INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. TAIWAN IS AN IMMENSELY COMPLICATING FACTOR IN ALL OF THIS, AS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM COHEN'S RECENT VISIT TO BEIJING. BOTH SIDES SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE US-CHINA TIES, BUT LARGELY BECAUSE OF TAIWAN, NEITHER SIDE WAS ABLE TO DRAW EVEN A ROUGH BLUEPRINT FOR SUCH A RELATIONSHIP. OVER TIME, THE CHINESE WILL TRY TO DRAW BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA CLOSER TO ITS WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT THE U.S., WHICH IS BASICALLY THAT WE SHOULD WITHDRAW ALL OUR MILITARY FORCES FROM THE REGION. (SECRETARY COHEN DESERVES GREAT CREDIT FOR SPEAKING AS FRANKLY AS HE DID IN SHANGHAI, AFTER HAVING LEFT BEIJING. ADDRESSING A GATHERING OF STOCKBROKERS IN THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, COHEN SAID, "U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE STABILITY, PEACE AND FREEDOM HAVE BENEFITED ALL THE NATIONS IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY CHINA." COHEN WENT ON TO SPEAK CRITICALLY OF THE CHINESE TENDENCY TO "DEMONIZE" THE U.S., AND REMINDED THEM THAT SUCH HARSH AND UNFAIR CRITICISM CAN PROVOKE RESPONSES IN KIND OUT OF AMERICA.)

IF KOREANS ARE TO UNDERSTAND AMERICANS AND OUR POLICIES, AND IF THEY ARE TO EFFECTIVELY ANALYZE OUR CHANGING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, THEY MUST TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE LARGER CONTEXT IN WHICH AMERICAN HOPES, IDEALS AND RESPONSIBILITIES PLAY THEMSELVES OUT. THERE IS A CERTAIN TENDENCY IN KOREAN THINKING, WHICH THEY THEMSELVES WRYLY ACKNOWLEDGE, TO BE LIKE "A FROG IN A WELL." SUCH A NARROW PERSPECTIVE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ENCOMPASS THE BROAD RANGE OF PRESSURES AND CONCERNS THAT POLICY MAKERS IN WASHINGTON HAVE TO CONTEND WITH AS THEY SEEK TO CHART A LOGICAL, GLOBAL COURSE FOR THE US IN THE TRICKY POST COLD WAR ERA.

IN KOREA, WHERE WE HAVE HAD TROOPS FOR FIFTY YEARS, SHOULD WE TAKE THE RIOTS AGAINST OUR PRESENCE AS A CONVENIENT EXCUSE FOR WITHDRAWING, AS SOME IN CONGRESS WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE US DO? IF WE WITHDRAW OR REDUCE OUR FORCES IN KOREA, WHAT WILL THAT DO TO OUR POSITION IN JAPAN? FINALLY, WHAT ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL IDEA OF A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM THAT, IN THEORY, WOULD PROTECT NORTH AMERICA FROM MISSILE ATTACKS BY "STATES OF CONCERN" SUCH AS NORTH KOREA? WHAT DOES SOUTH KOREA'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA DO TO THAT CONCEPT, WHICH IS BEING STRIDENTLY DENOUNCED BY BOTH THE CHINESE AND RUSSIANS?

THESE ARE SOME OF THE CONCERNS THAT AMERICAN POLICY MAKERS NEED TO THINK ABOUT SERIOUSLY. THEY ARE HIGHLY COMPLICATED QUESTIONS, WITH IMMENSE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTINUING U.S. ROLE IN ASIA AND THE WORLD. THEY NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AT A TIME WHEN IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GIVE THEM THE ATTENTION THEY REQUIRE. THE UNITED STATES IS HEADING INTO A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THAT WILL BE THE FOCUS OF MOST OF OUR NATIONAL ATTENTION UNTIL EARLY NOVEMBER.

WE AMERICANS ARE FORTUNATE THAT PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS THAT AMERICAN FORCES NEED TO REMAIN IN ASIA, AS A STABILIZING FACTOR, EVEN AFTER THE THREAT OF WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA HAS RECEDED. CHAIRMAN KIM JONG-IL, IN HIS RECENT INTERVIEW WITH A KOREAN-AMERICAN JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD BE HARD FOR AMERICAN FORCES TO LEAVE THE REGION RIGHT AWAY. THERE IS THUS NO IMMEDIATE NEED TO CHANGE OUR MILITARY POSTURE. THE THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA REMAINS REAL TODAY, AND IS NOT GOING TO EVAPORATE QUICKLY.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR KOREAN AND JAPANESE ALLIES, IS TO DEVELOP LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR A RESHAPED AND REDUCED AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA THAT WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A STABILIZING ROLE WITHOUT PROVOKING THE RESENTMENT AND ANIMOSITY THAT OUR CURRENT LEVEL OF DEPLOYMENT CAUSES IN BOTH JAPAN AND KOREA. WE WOULD THEN HAVE A DEVELOPED POSITION TO MOVE TO IN AN ORDERLY FASHION IF AND WHEN NORTH KOREA PULLS BACK MILITARY UNITS ALONG THE DMZ, AND GIVES CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF ITS CONVERSION TO PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. (THE KOREA INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES, THE CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES (US) AND THE OKAZAKI INSTITUTE HAVE ALREADY DONE VALUABLE WORK ON TRILATERAL NAVAL COOPERATION.)

WE ALSO NEED TO DEAL WITH CURRENT, PRESSING PROBLEMS ON THE ROK-AMERICAN AGENDA; THE SOFA NEGOTIATIONS, THE ISSUE OF BOMBING RANGES, THE NO GUN RI INVESTIGATION. AS PROGRESS IS MADE ON THESE SPECIFIC ISSUES, PRESSURE ON THE MAJOR QUESTION OF THE US PRESENCE IN KOREA WILL BE REDUCED AND IT WILL BE EASIER TO MAKE MORE SENSIBLE LONG-RANGE DECISIONS THAT ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH KOREA AND THE U.S.

WE AND OUR KOREAN FRIENDS WILL NEED TO REMIND OURSELVES THAT NEW CHALLENGES GROWING OUT OF A SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS LIKE THE PYONGYANG SUMMIT, CAN BE AS IMPORTANT AND AS DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH AS PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF A STRATEGIC SET-BACK SUCH AS DIEN BIEN PHU. BUT WE SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS VASTLY PREFERABLE TO BE DEALING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESS RATHER THAN THE RESIDUES OF A FAILURE.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SKETCH WHAT I SEE AS THE WORST AND BEST OUTCOMES THAT MIGHT EVOLVE FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION.

A FAILURE TO CONSTRUCTIVELY NEGOTIATE SOFA AND OTHER CURRENT PROBLEMS I TO FLEXIBLE, MILITARY PLANNING BY SEOUL, TOKYO AND WASHINGTON. PROGRESS ON THESE TWO FRONTS WOULD MAKE IT MORE POSSIBLE EVENTUALLY TO ENGAGE RUSSIA AND CHINA IN A DIALOGUE ON HOW THE MAJOR POWERS CAN BEST WORK TOGETHER TO DETER MISSILE THREATS FROM THE "STATES OF CONCERN."

IN THE WAKE OF DIEN BIEN PHU, AMERICA HAD NO STRONG ALLIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WAS IN ITS HEY-DAY, THE SO-CALLED "PEKING- PYONGYANG-PHNOM PENH-DJAKARTA AXIS" WAS WORKING HARD TO GET US OUT OF ASIA, AND THE COLD WAR WAS IN ONE OF ITS MOST VIRULENT STAGES. IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE AMERICA CAME TO BELIEVE THAT ONLY BY FIGHTING COULD WE RETAIN INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.

THE SITUATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA TODAY IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. WE HAVE STRONG ALLIANCES WITH KOREA AND JAPAN. AND IN PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG, WE HAVE A STAUNCH FRIEND AND ALLY WHOSE CREATIVE DIPLOMACY WITH HIS NEIGHBORS AND WITH NORTH KOREA HAS RELEASED NEW FORCES IN THE REGION. THE NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENT, WHOEVER HE IS, CAN USE PRESIDENT KIM'S LAST TWO YEARS IN OFFICE AS A TIME TO CREATE A NEW POSTURE FOR THE US IN NORTHEAST ASIA. HOW WELL HE DOES THIS WILL LARGELY DETERMINE THE FUTURE PATTERN OF AMERICA'S RELATIONS WITH KOREA AND ITS NEIGHBORS IN THE ERA THAT IS NOW BEGINNING.

/DONALD GREG입력시간 2000/08/02 20:00

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